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Abstract: The axioms of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics lack clear physical meaning.  In particular, 
they say nothing about nonlocality. Yet quantum mechanics is not only nonlocal, it is twice nonlocal:
there are nonlocal quantum correlations, and there is the Aharonov-Bohm effect, which implies that an 
electric or magnetic field here may act on an electron there.  Can we invert the logical hierarchy?  That is, 
can we adopt nonlocality as an axiom for quantum mechanics and derive quantum mechanics from this 
axiom and an additional axiom of causality?  Three versions of these two axioms lead to three different 
theories, characterized by “maximal nonlocal correlations”, “jamming” and “modular energy”.  Where is
quantum mechanics in these theories?
PACS 3.65.Vf
Among Itamar Pitowsky’s many admirable qualities, I admired most his capacity
for thoroughly exploring incompatible points of view, approaches and theoretical 
frameworks.  We tend to ignore approaches that are incompatible with our own.  It is a
natural tendency.  It takes work to overcome it.  Itamar worked hard to understand all 
points of view, which led to another of his admirable qualities, his comprehensive
knowledge.  He was a true philosopher – love of knowledge and understanding animated 
him.  As a result, whether in a seminar on campus or at a demonstration on a street
corner, he most often understood all the points of view better than anyone else did.  The 
Talmud )דס תוכרב ,א( expresses this capacity in a adage, “ םימכח ידימלת םלועב םולש םיברמ ” –
“scholars bring peace to the world” – which Rabbi Avraham Kook (1865–1935) 
explained as follows:  
    Some people mistakenly believe that world peace demands uniformity of views and practices.  
When they see scholars studying philosophy and Torah and arriving at a plurality of views and 
approaches, they see only controversy and discord.  But – on the contrary – true peace comes to 
the world only by virtue of its plurality.  The plurality of peace means appreciating each view and 
approach and seeing how each has its own place, consistent with its value, context and content.
(From ח היאר תלוע"ע א 'לש ; translations from Hebrew are mine.)  One theoretical 
framework that Itamar explored [1] is the one that I have the honor to present here.
•
Quantum mechanics doesn’t supply its own interpretation.  The numerous 
competing interpretations of quantum mechanics testify to the fact that quantum 
mechanics doesn’t supply its own interpretation.  About one of these interpretations,    
due to H. Everett [2] and J. A. Wheeler [3], Bryce DeWitt said the following:
    Everett took the quantum theory the way it was and didn't impose anything on it from the 
outside.  No classical realm.  Does the theory produce its own interpretation?  If so, how?  And he, 
in my view he's the only one who's answered properly in the affirmative that it provides its own 
interpretation [4].
Yet, more than half a century after Everett’s bold and provocative paper, the Everett-
Wheeler interpretation remains exactly that – one more competing interpretation, with   
no consensus in sight.  This irony, as well, testifies to the fact that quantum mechanics 
doesn’t supply its own interpretation.  What would it take to show that, on the contrary,
quantum mechanics does supply its own interpretation?  It would take an interpretation
so natural and satisfactory as to induce consensus.  But how could such an interpretation 
ever spring from the opaque axioms of quantum mechanics?  If we seek a theory that   
has clear, unambiguous physical meaning, let us derive it from axioms that have clear, 
unambiguous physical meaning.  This paper argues that the way towards a natural and 
satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics passes through new and physically 
meaningful axioms for the theory, and reports attempts to define such axioms.
The axioms of quantum mechanics are notoriously opaque.  Without trying or 
needing to be comprehensive, let us mention a few of them.  “Any possible physical state
corresponds to a ray in a Hilbert space.”  “Physical observables correspond to Hermitian 
operators.”  Do these axioms tell us something about the physical world?  Or do they 
merely list mathematical structures useful for describing the world?  If they merely list 
useful mathematical structures, what is it about the underlying physics that makes these 
structures useful?  What we want, after all, is the physics.  “If P(a,ψ) is the probability 
that a measurement of a physical observable A, corresponding to a Hermitian operator Â,
on a system in the normalized state |ψ>, yields a, then P(a,ψ) = <ψ| Πa |ψ>, where Πa
projects onto the subspace of eigenstates of Â having eigenvalue a.”  This axiom, too, is 
opaque; it offers no hint as to whether the probability P(a,ψ) is intrinsic or derives from 
an underlying determinism.  It is more of an algorithm than an axiom.
Long ago, Yakir Aharonov [5] drew an analogy that is at once amusing and 
penetrating.   The special theory of relativity, we know, follows elegantly from two 
axioms:  first, the laws of physics are the same for observers in all inertial reference 
frames; second, the speed of light is a constant of nature.  These axioms have clear 
physical meanings:  the first specifies a fundamental space-time symmetry and the second 
specifies a physical constant. Suppose we had, instead of these two standard axioms, 
three “nonstandard” axioms:  first, physical objects contract in the direction of their 
motion (FitzGerald contraction); second, this contraction and a “local time” (lacking clear 
physical significance) combine in “Lorentz transformations” that form a group; third,
simultaneity is subjective.  Even supposing we could deduce the special theory of 
relativity from these three axioms, would there be consensus about its interpretation?  
What kind of consensus could there be, as long as we were stuck with the wrong axioms?  
Analogously, perhaps consensus about how to interpret quantum mechanics is elusive 
because we are stuck with the wrong axioms for the theory. Perhaps we have grasped
quantum mechanics by the tail, or by the hind legs, instead of by the horns. 
If this analogy seems strained, let us note that all three of these “nonstandard”
axioms had proponents (not including A. Einstein) already in 1905.  Moreover, as late   
as 1909, H. Poincaré delivered a series of lectures in Göttingen, culminating in a lecture 
on “La mécanique nouvelle”.  At the basis of Poincaré’s “new mechanics” were three 
axioms, the third being the FitzGerald contraction:  “One needs to make still a third 
hypothesis, much more surprising, much more difficult to accept, one which is of much 
hindrance to what we are currently used to.  A body in translational motion suffers a 
deformation in the direction in which it is displaced.” [6]  In Poincaré’s new mechanics, 
the FitzGerald contraction was an axiom in itself, not a consequence of other axioms, 
hence Poincaré found it “much more difficult to accept” than we do. Well, aren’t all the 
axioms of quantum mechanics surprising, difficult to accept, and of much hindrance to 
what we are used to?
We can take the analogy further [5].  The logical structure of the special theory  
of relativity is exemplary. From its two axioms we can deduce all the kinematics of the 
theory, and with scarcely more input we can deduce all the dynamics as well.  How can 
two axioms be so efficient?  If we look at the axioms with a Newtonian mindset, we see 
clearly that the two axioms contradict each other.  Well, of course they don’t contradict 
each other.  But they come so close to contradicting each other, that a unique mechanics 
reconciles them:  Einstein’s special theory of relativity.  Now in the quantum world, as 
well, we have two physical principles that come close to contradicting each other.  One 
is the principle of causality: relativistic causality, also called “no signalling”, is the 
principle that no signal can travel faster than light.  The other principle is nonlocality.  
Quantum mechanics is nonlocal, indeed twice nonlocal:  it is nonlocal in two inequivalent 
ways.  There is the nonlocality of the Aharonov-Bohm [7] and related [8] effects, and 
there is the nonlocality implicit in quantum correlations that violate Bell’s [9] inequality.  
Let us briefly comment on each of these.
One often reads that the Aharonov-Bohm effect proves that the scalar and vector 
potentials of electromagnetism have a degree of reality in quantum physics that they do 
not have in classical physics.  This distinction is valid, but it can mislead us into thinking 
that the Aharonov-Bohm effect is local, because an electron diffracting around a shielded 
solenoid or capacitor interacts locally with the vector potential of the magnetic field in 
the solenoid, or with the scalar potential of the electric field in the capacitor.  However,
there is no way to measure these potentials.  What is measurable are the magnetic and 
electric fields.  The dependence of the electron diffraction pattern on these fields, i.e. the 
Aharonov-Bohm effect, must be nonlocal, because the electron does not pass through 
them. Yet the fields are produced locally; so one might try (i.e. by adjusting the capacitor
or the current in the solenoid) to send a superluminal signal that would show up in the 
electron diffraction pattern.  It is indeed possible to send signals that show up in the 
interference pattern, but they are never superluminal.
Bell’s inequality implies that quantum correlations can be nonlocal in the 
following sense.  Let Alice and Bob, shown in Fig. 1, be two experimental physicists, 
Fig. 1. Alice and Bob (drawn by Tom Oreb © Walt Disney Co) with their respective black boxes.
in their respective labs.   Note that each is equipped with a black box.  From spacelike-
separated measurements on their respective black boxes, Alice and Bob obtain 
correlations that violate Bell’s inequality.  They may suppose that the correlations already 
existed (as local “plans” or programs) in the black boxes before their measurements,    
but this explanation is what Bell ruled out.  Another explanation – that the black boxes 
send superluminal signals to each other – might suggest to them that they, too, could send 
superluminal signals to each other.  But they cannot [10].  Quantum correlations can 
violate Bell’s inequality but they are useless for signalling. 
The coexistence of nonlocality and causality in the Aharonov-Bohm effect and   
in nonlocal quantum correlations is remarkable.  If there are nonlocal effects, what stops 
us from signalling with them?  Quantum mechanics must be an extraordinary theory if    
it can do this trick – if it can make nonlocality and causality coexist.  A. Shimony [11-12] 
speculated that quantum mechanics might be the only theory that can do so, i.e. that 
quantum mechanics might follow uniquely from the two axioms of nonlocality and 
causality.  Aharonov [5] even suggested a part of the logical structure.  If we look at the 
details of just how nonlocality coexists with causality, we discover they always involve
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quantum uncertainty.  Indeed, quantum mechanics has to be a probabilistic theory, 
because if nonlocal influences were certain, how could they not violate causality?  
Aharonov’s suggestion thus inverts the conventional logical hierarchy of quantum 
mechanics:  instead of making probability an axiom and deriving nonlocality as a 
quantum effect, he makes nonlocality an axiom and derives probability (uncertainty)      
as a quantum effect.
Inspired by Aharonov’s suggestion, I will now describe three attempts [13-15] to 
define more precisely the axioms of “causality” and “nonlocality” and to derive quantum 
mechanics from them.  The three attempts fall under the headings “Maximally nonlocal
correlations” (or “PR boxes”), “Jamming”, and “Modular energy”.
I. Maximally nonlocal correlations
Our goal is to derive quantum mechanics, but we have still to decide whether    
we should try to derive nonrelativistic or relativistic quantum mechanics.  We have two 
reasons to decide for nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.  First, it is a simpler theory
with a superior formalism.  Relativistic quantum mechanics naturally allows creation of 
particle-antiparticle pairs; it is more complicated in that the number of particles is not 
fixed.  Even if we artificially fix the number of particles, the formalism of relativistic
quantum mechanics is not satisfactory:  not all of its Hermitian operators correspond to 
physical observables [16].  That is, not all of its Hermitian operators are measurable in 
practice.  Relativistic causality imposes constraints on what is measurable in practice.  
However, these constraints do not apply to the Hermitian operators of nonrelativistic 
quantum mechanics; they are all measurable [17]. If our goal is to find the right axioms 
for quantum mechanics, we have a better chance of finding them for a theory that already 
has a satisfactory formalism.  It is also plausible that if we find the right axioms for the 
nonrelativistic theory, we will be in a better position to find the right axioms for the 
relativistic theory, axioms that do not lead to unmeasurable Hermitian operators.  
The second reason to decide for nonrelativistic quantum mechanics has to do 
with the axiom of nonrelativistic causality.  According to this axiom, no signal can travel 
faster than the speed of light, c.  In the nonrelativistic limit, c is infinite, so the axiom of 
relativistic causality appears, initially, to become vacuous.  But closer inspection reveals 
that the axiom of relativistic causality is actually stronger in this limit:  it tells us that 
quantum correlations cannot be used to send signals at any speed.  How so?  Suppose 
that the quantum correlations measured by Alice and Bob could be used to send a signal.  
These correlations do not depend on whether the interval between Alice’s and Bob’s 
respective measurements is spacelike or timelike; indeed, nothing in nonrelativistic 
quantum mechanics can distinguish between spacelike and timelike intervals, because 
there is no c. Hence if quantum correlations could be used to send any signal, they could 
be used to send a superluminal signal.  Hence they cannot be used to send any signal.  If 
our choice of an axiom of nonlocality has to do with nonlocal correlations, the axiom of 
causality implies that quantum correlations are useless for sending signals at any speed.  
We find ourselves with two axioms with clear physical meaning:
1. No quantum correlations can be used to send signals.
2. Some quantum correlations are nonlocal.
The second axiom means that some quantum correlations violate some version of Bell’s 
inequality.   The most suitable version of Bell’s inequality for the case of bipartite 
correlations (measured by Alice and Bob) is due to Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt 
(CHSH) [18].   Let us assume that Alice and Bob make a series of joint measurements on 
their respective boxes, in which Alice measures either A or A' and Bob measures either B
or B' in each joint measurement, where A, A', B and B' are physical observables.  In each 
joint measurement they must each choose which observable to measure – they can never 
measure both – and the results of their measurements are always 1 or –1.  From the 
results of their joint measurements, they can compute four types of correlations:  C(A,B), 
C(A',B), C(A,B') and C(A',B'), where C(A,B) is the correlation between the results of their 
joint measurements when Alice chooses to measure A and Bob chooses to measure B, and 
so on.  The CHSH inequality states that if these correlations already existed (as local 
plans or programs) in the black boxes before their measurements, then a certain 
combination of them is bounded in absolute magnitude:
                              | C(A,B) + C(A,B′) + C(A′,B) − C(A′,B′) | ≤ 2    .                              (1)
So if the correlations that Alice and Bob measure satisfy this inequality, they are        
local correlations.  Conversely, if the correlations that they measure do not satisfy the 
inequality, they are nonlocal correlations.  Axiom 2 above, the nonlocality axiom, states 
that at least for some physical variables A, A', B and B' and some preparation of their 
black boxes, the correlations they measure violate the CHSH inequality.   
Besides the bound 2 of the CHSH inequality, two other numbers, 2√2 and 4, are 
important bounds for the left-hand side of Eq. 1.  If the correlations C(A,B), C(A',B), 
C(A,B') and C(A',B') were completely independent, the absolute value on the left-hand 
side could be as large as 4.  But if they are quantum correlations, the absolute value on 
the left-hand side can only be as large as “Tsirelson’s bound” [19], which is 2√2.  It can 
be larger than 2 just as 2√2 is larger than 2, but it cannot be larger than 2√2.  Now the 
fact that quantum correlations cannot violate Tsirelson’s bound is curious.  If they are 
strong enough to violate the CHSH inequality, why aren’t they strong enough to violate 
Tsirelson’s bound?  
A plausible answer to this question, in the spirit of Aharonov’s suggestion, is       
that if quantum correlations were any stronger, they would violate causality as well as 
Tsirelson’s bound.  Indeed, if quantum mechanics follows from our two axioms, then   
so does Tsirelson’s bound – a theorem of quantum mechanics.  Conversely, if Tsirelson’s 
bound does not follow from our two axioms, then certainly quantum mechanics does not.  
So if we can find “maximally nonlocal” correlation functions Cmax(A,B), Cmax(A',B), 
Cmax(A,B') and Cmax(A',B') that obey the two axioms but violate Tsirelson’s bound, we 
must conclude that quantum mechanics does not follow from our two axioms.  
It is straightforward to define such correlations.  We do it in two steps:
1. In any measurement of A, A′, B or B′, let the results 1 and −1 be equally likely.
2. Let Cmax(A,B) = Cmax(A,B′) = Cmax(A′,B) = 1 = −Cmax(A′,B′).
The first step insures that whatever Alice chooses to measure will not change the 
probabilities of ±1 as results of Bob’s measurement – whether he measures B or B′ –   
and vice versa, because in any case the probabilities of all the results equal 1/2.  Hence
Alice cannot send a signal to Bob by her choice of what to measure, and vice versa.  
These correlations satisfy the axiom of causality.  At the same time, they are so strong –
joint measurements of A and B, of A' and B, and of A and B' are perfectly correlated,
while joint measurements of A' and B' are perfectly anticorrelated – that the left-hand 
side of Eq. 1 violates the CHSH inequality and Tsirelson’s bound maximally.  
Our attempt to derive nonrelativistic quantum mechanics from two axioms is 
apparently a failure, but not necessarily a total failure.  We may still hope that, with an 
additional axiom, we will be able to derive it.  Indeed, W. van Dam [20] showed that in a 
world containing maximally nonlocal correlations, an important class of communication 
tasks would become dramatically simpler.  G. Brassard et al. [21] extended this result to 
nonlocal correlations that are not maximal, indeed not much stronger than nonlocal 
quantum correlations.   More recently, M. Pawłowski et al. [22] have defined an axiom of 
“information causality” and shown that any nonlocal correlation violating Tsirelson’s 
bound is incompatible with this axiom.  Their results are striking, but the physical 
meaning of “information causality” is perhaps not sufficiently clear.  Maximal nonlocal 
correlations have even inspired experimental work [23].
II. Jamming
There is action at a distance in the Aharonov-Bohm effect.  A solenoid acts at a 
distance on a beam of electrons; the interference pattern of the electrons depends on how
the experimental physicist prepares the solenoid.  By contrast, there is no action at a 
distance in quantum correlations.  If there were, Alice and Bob could use them to send 
signals to each other; but in quantum correlations there is only “passion at a distance”, as
Shimony [11] aptly put it.  If we define nonlocality as action at a distance, can we derive 
quantum mechanics (or some part of it) from nonlocality and causality?  We shall see that 
“jamming”, a presumably non-quantum form of action at a distance, could coexist with 
causality.  We shall also discuss an axiom for “modular energy”, a quantum form of 
action at a distance.
Having redefined the axiom of nonlocality, we must now redefine also the axiom 
of causality.  We cannot say, “No action at a distance can be used to send signals,” when 
action at distance is itself a signal.  We can only say that the signal cannot be outside the 
forward light cone of the act of sending it.  So we are back to relativistic causality. Our 
two axioms are then
1. There is no superluminal signalling.
2. There is action at a distance. 
In the Aharonov-Bohm effect, the act of preparing the solenoid or capacitor produces 
electromagnetic radiation, which cannot have an effect outside the forward light cone of 
the preparation.  If the effect shows up in the interference pattern, it is always within the 
forward light cone of the preparation and there is no superluminal signalling.
We return to Alice and Bob, and welcome their friend, Jim the Jammer (in Fig. 2).  
Jim has a large black box of his own, which acts nonlocally on their boxes.  If Jim presses 
the button on his box, it turns their nonlocal correlations into local correlations, i.e. into 
correlations that obey the CHSH inequality.  The probability of each result 1 or –1 does 
not change – it remains 1/2 – but the correlations change.  Let’s assume that their results  
Fig. 2. Alice and Bob, with Jim the Jammer.
become completely uncorrelated.  So here we have Jim acting at a distance to change the 
correlations between the black boxes of Alice and Bob.  Does this action at a distance 
obey the no-signalling constraint?  Clearly, Jim cannot send a signal to either Alice or
Bob
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Bob, because his action does not change the probabilities of 1 and –1 as results of their 
measurements.  But can Jim send a signal to Alice and Bob?  Indeed he can, because 
when Alice and Bob compare their results and compute correlations, they immediately 
identify their correlations as local or nonlocal.  If Alice, Bob and Jim have arranged in 
advance that local correlations mean “Yes”, and nonlocal correlations mean “No” (in 
some context), then Jim can signal “Yes” or “No” by choosing to jam, or not to jam, their 
correlations.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) are spacetime diagrams of jamming (with time on the 
vertical axis).  For simplicity, we reduce jamming to three spacetime events.  At j, Jim 
may press the button on his black box.  At a and b, Alice and Bob make their respective 
measurements.  Now, Alice and Bob can compare their results anywhere, and only, in the 
overlap of their future light cones.  Hence, they can receive Jim’s signal anywhere, and 
only, in the overlap of their future light cones.  However, if this overlap does not lie 
entirely within the future light cone of  j, Jim’s signal can be superluminal.  So for 
jamming to be consistent with the no-signalling axiom, jamming must work only when 
the overlap of the future light cones of a and b lies within the future light cone of j.  
(a)                                                                                 (b)
Fig. 3. The overlap of the future light cones of a and b either (a) lies or (b) does not lie
entirely within the future light cone of j.
Hence in Fig. 3(a) Jim can jam their correlations, in Fig 3(b) he cannot.  Then jamming is 
consistent with our two axioms.  
On the face of it, at least, there is nothing like jamming in quantum mechanics.  If 
not, then we have once again shown that causality and nonlocality – now in the guise of 
action at a distance – do not imply quantum mechanics as a unique theory:  at least one 
other theory, however rudimentary, is consistent with these two axioms.  Another failure!
III. Modular energy
Twice, starting with a general axiom of nonlocality, we have failed to derive 
quantum mechanics.  What if we start with an axiom of nonlocality that is tailored to 
quantum mechanics?  Can we then derive quantum mechanics (or part of it)?  If we 
succeed, our success will be less impressive because of the initial tailoring; but at least 
we may succeed.  I will now define an axiom of nonlocality that is, in fact, a dynamical 
form of quantum nonlocality [24].  The axiom of causality, as well, will be tailored to 
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.  
We begin with the axiom of causality.  The speed of light has no special status in 
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.  For nonlocal correlations, this fact implies that 
correlations are useless for any kind of signalling, not just superluminal signalling.  Our 
first try at an axiom of causality was, therefore, that no correlations can be used for 
signalling.  But here we will define nonlocal dynamics instead of nonlocal correlations.  
Our axiom cannot be that no dynamics can be used for signalling; causal relations, 
including signalling, are inherent in dynamics.  If Alice sends a particle to Bob, the 
particle carries a signal.  A more plausible axiom of causality is that signalling is possible 
only via a material interaction, i.e. only when a particle or other object connects the cause 
and effect.    If Alice’s particle mysteriously disappears and then reappears in Bob’s lab, 
that particle cannot carry a signal, according to this axiom of causality.
We now define an axiom of nonlocality for a specific physical setting that
includes Alice and Bob.  Fig. 4 shows a shaft with a piston in it at Bob’s end.  The piston
Fig.4. Alice may release a particle at her end while Bob throws a ball at his end.
can slide without friction in the shaft.  Attached to the outer end of the piston is a box 
with two open sides.  Bob throws a ball that ricochets through the box in two elastic 
collisions, pushing the (stationary) piston in a short distance.  Alice’s end of the shaft is 
closed, yet she can release a particle at her end.  Our axiom of nonlocality states that the 
ball and particle – if Alice releases a particle – exchange energy nonlocally in the time 
particle
ball
between the two collisions.  Energy is conserved, but it can mysteriously disappear from 
Alice’s lab and reappear in Bob’s, even before the particle reaches the piston.
On the face of it, this axiom contradicts the causality axiom.  If Alice chooses to 
release a particle into the shaft, Bob will detect a change in the energy of the ball; if she 
chooses not to, he will detect no change.  Thus Alice can signal to Bob via her choice 
whether or not to release a particle.  In the spirit of Aharonov’s suggestion, we can infer
that Bob’s measurements of energy must be uncertain.  Even so, there seems to be no
way to reconcile the nonlocality axiom with the causality axiom. Let the energies EA and 
EB of the particle and the ball, respectively, be distributed according to probability 
distributions, so that the energy of each is uncertain.  If the particle enters the shaft, we 
expect the probability distribution of EB to change.  If so, Alice and Bob can still use 
nonlocal energy exchange to send a signal – if not in one run of the experiment, then in 
many simultaneous runs on many copies of the experiment:  Alice’s signal will emerge 
from the statistics of Bob’s measurements.
Yet mathematical analysis [24] reveals an additional possibility.  Let E0 be a 
parameter with units of energy.  For any E0 and for any energy E, we define an associated 
quantity Emod = E modulo E0 (also written Emod = E mod E0), which is the energy E minus 
a multiple of E0 such that 0 ≤ Emod < E0.  We call this quantity modular energy.  If the
particle and the ball exchange modular energy, they exchange at most E0 in energy.  
Since the total energy EA + EB is conserved in any exchange, so is the total modular 
energy EA + EB mod E0, for any E0.  Now if, for any E0, the distribution of the modular 
energy EB mod E0 of the ball is flat – i.e. if all values of EB mod E0 between 0 and E0 are 
equally likely – then an exchange of energy between the particle and the ball will not 
change the distribution of EB mod E0, although it will, in general, change the distribution 
of EA mod E0.  This one-way effect occurs if and only if the distribution of EB mod E0 is 
flat.  But if the distribution of EB mod E0 is flat, then the uncertainty in EB is at least E0:  
ΔEB  ≥ E0    .
We can say that a nonlocal exchange of energy of up to E0 between the particle and the 
ball is consistent with causality, because Bob cannot detect the exchange when ΔEB  ≥ E0.
For how long must the uncertainty ΔEB be at least E0?  We may reason as follows:  
ΔEB must be at least E0 for the whole time T it takes Alice’s particle to reach the piston.  
This reasoning suggests an inverse relationship between the time T and ΔEB, since the 
more energy a particle has, the less time it takes to reach the piston, and the more energy 
it transfers to the ball.  Indeed, let L be the distance from Alice's end of the shaft to the 
piston and let mA, mB and pA, pB be the masses and momenta of the particle and the ball, 
respectively.  In the limit of mA, mB negligibly small compared to the mass M of the 
piston, a straightforward classical calculation shows that EB changes by 4pA pB/M, if and 
only if Alice releases the particle.  Bob can detect a nonlocal transfer of energy only if 
ΔEB < 4pA pB /M.  He cannot detect it if ΔEB > 4pA pB /M.  Since pA = mAL /T, we can 
eliminate pA to obtain  
                                                      ΔEB > 4mAL pB /MT                                                     (2)
as the condition for Bob not to detect the nonlocal transfer of energy.  
Eq. (2) looks like an uncertainty relation for ΔEB and T.  But T in Eq. (2) is the 
time Alice’s particle takes to reach the piston; it is not the minimum time Δt that Bob
takes to measure EB with uncertainty ΔEB. Moreover, Bob’s measurement of EB is a local 
measurement.  The uncertainty in a local measurement depends only on local variables.
The axiom of nonlocality implies that EB, but not ΔEB, depends nonlocally on what Alice
does. In particular, ΔEB cannot depend on T if T is not a local variable.  If Alice releases
a particle with momentum pA, then EB changes by 4pA pB/M (according to the classical 
calculation), but T depends on L and mA as well as pA.  Indeed, for a given change in EB,
the time T may be arbitrarily large. So, on the one hand, ΔEB cannot depend on T.  On 
the other hand, E0 – which is the maximum nonlocal energy transfer – can certainly 
depend on T.  Such a dependence is quite consistent with the axiom of nonlocality.  In 
brief, what Eq. (2) tells us is not how Δt depends on ΔEB, but rather how E0 depends on
T:  Eq. (2) tells us that E0 is inversely related to T.
And now, from this inverse relation, we can infer how nonlocal energy exchange 
could be consistent with the axiom of causality.  Let E0 = k/T, for some constant k, while
Δt is the time it takes to measure EB with uncertainty ΔEB.  If the inequality Δt ≥ k/ΔEB
holds, then ΔEB ≤ E0 implies Δt ≥ T  while Δt < T implies ΔEB > E0, and Bob will never 
detect an exchange of energy before the particle reaches him.  Conversely, if Δt ≥ k/ΔEB
does not hold, we have Δt ΔEB < E0T and Bob can detect the nonlocal exchange of energy 
by measuring EB with uncertainty ΔEB < E0 in a time Δt < T.  The axiom of causality 
therefore demands the inequality Δt ≥ k/ΔEB; and for this axiom to apply consistently to 
nonlocal exchange of energy, k must be a universal constant:  Alice and Bob must not be 
able to circumvent the inequality Δt ≥ k/ΔEB by varying parameters of their experiment
so as to vary k.  Thus k is a universal constant, which we can identify with Planck’s
constant h.
As noted, in quantum mechanics there is nonlocal exchange of energy.  What 
allows quantum mechanics and causality to coexist, despite this nonlocal exchange, is the 
uncertainty relation for energy E and time t [24].  We have inverted the logical hierarchy, 
and from axioms of causality and nonlocality, we have derived a principle of quantum 
theory:  the uncertainty relation for energy and time, ΔE Δt ≥ h.  
•
Let us conclude by reviewing our progress towards a derivation of nonrelativistic 
quantum mechanics from the axioms of causality and nonlocality.  All three attempts 
presented here fall short of a complete derivation.  Yet there is reason for optimism.  
Maximal nonlocal correlations outperform quantum mechanics, but if we take a closer 
look, we find something quite unreasonable about them.  They are so strongly correlated 
that, for example, Alice can actually determine the product of measurements of B and B'
by choosing whether to measure A, or A'; for if she measures A, then B and B' are 
perfectly correlated, while if she measures A', then B and B' are perfectly anticorrelated. 
Thus Alice could superluminally signal to Bob, if it were not for the (tacit) assumption 
that Bob cannot measure both B and B' but only one of them, as in quantum mechanics.  
In quantum mechanics, with its uncertainty relations, this assumption is natural.  But in a 
theory with maximally nonlocal correlations, it is quite unnatural. Bob can measure B
directly and also infer B' indirectly from Alice’s measurement.  It is true that this method 
of measuring B and B' does not allow Alice to send a superluminal signal to Bob, but it 
defeats any uncertainty relation for B and B'.  We may still hope, therefore, that if we 
consider nonlocal correlations as subject to the logic of uncertainty relations, we will 
arrive uniquely at quantum correlations.
As for jamming, it is notable that the authors of Ref. [14] never proved the 
incompatibility of jamming with quantum mechanics.  It just seemed obvious to them.  
Yet it is possible to devise a quantum thought-experiment that is equivalent to jamming.  
Let Alice, Bob and Jim share triplets in the GHZ state [25]:
                                   ,   
2
1
JimBobAliceJimBobAliceGHZ
                     (3)
Eq. (3) does not show the spatial wave functions of Alice, Bob and Jim, but it shows the 
combined state of an ensemble of three spin-1/2 atoms distributed among them.  Now 
suppose Jim measures either the z-component or the x-component of the spin of his atom.  
If he measures the z-component of the spin, he leaves the atoms of Alice and Bob in a 
mixture of product states; if he measures the x-component of the spin, he leaves their
atoms in a mixture of entangled states.  Jim announces the results of his measurements, 
but he does not announce what he measured; nevertheless Alice and Bob can deduce
what he measured if they compare the results of their measurements.  They can do so, 
however, only in the future light cone of his announcement (which we can identify with 
the future light cone of j in Fig. 3) because they need the results of Jim’s measurements,
as well, to deduce what he measured.  This is jamming, within quantum mechanics!  
Hence the question of whether quantum mechanics is the unique theory reconciling 
causality and action at a distance remains open after all.
These optimistic thoughts arose in the course of writing this paper, and I hope to 
discuss them further in a separate work.
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